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ARGUMENT 
Point One 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS ENTERED INTO AN 
ORAL AGREEMENT TO SELL THE 1986 KENWORTH 
TRACTOR TO DEFENDANT KROGMAN 
A. Standard of Review. 
While the Defendant concurs with the Plaintiffs statement of the 
standard of review, the Defendant improperly suggests that an additional 
standard of review exists in this case which prevents this Court from 
overturning the Decision of the trial court. The Defendant suggests in his brief 
at page 15 that this Court can not overturn the District Court's decision 
because only the District Court could determine the credibility of the 
witnesses. The Defendant is wrong. As stated in the Plaintiff s Brief, page 
23-24, the standard of review for reviewing a district court's findings of fact is 
that they may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and "due regard" must 
be given the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. Cambelt Int' Coip. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). 
Whether a legal oral contract existed is a question of law which is reviewed 
for correctness. John Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 
883 (Utah App. 1994). 
1 
In this case, however, this court is not confronted with a credibility 
question. Even if one discounts or ignores all of the testimony of the Plaintiff, 
there remains no evidence to find that a contract existed between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant Krogman to sell the 1986 Kenworth to Defendant The 
Defendant admits in his brief at page 15 that the District Court's findings of a 
contract were not based upon the testimony of the Plaintiff. Krogman. 
Instead, the Defendant asserts that the District Court's findings of a contract 
were based upon the testimony of Mr. Mouille, the Defendant Krogman, and 
John K. Rice. Accordingly, credibility between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant is not at issue within the standard of review. Therefore, this court 
should review the evidence to determine whether the findings support the legal 
conclusion that a contract existed. John Deere Co., supra. 
B. Defendant's Statement of Facts. 
The Plaintiff contends that many of the Defendant's Statement of Facts 
are misleading because they are taken out of context from the trial testimony. 
The Plaintiff contends that the more accurate and complete recitation of facts 
are set forth in the Plaintiffs Brief because the Plaintiff was charged with 
2 
niarsliiilui}.' Illlii" rviduiu* and lit• umiphul wiiilli lllliih. iu|inium'iil " llnvsrvu, 
the Plaintiff will only object to three of the Defendant s Statement of Facts 
and label them bald assertions. 
Tin/ I IN Initial!! s Malum nl i Il llhttls Ni Ill msscils as HI l.in 1 lliat 
"Plaintiff Donohue and Defendant Krogman entered into a verbal 
agreement..." This is pureh ^ ulusion of Defendant's counsel \To witness 
testiiituai i> ' \ erbal agreement i-a:, . . . . i • anu. stead , 
both Defendants testified that these discussions were mere negotiations. 
(Transcript, p . 130 and p. 193 -19 t) B- 3th Defendants testified the) T 
understood during this meeting that the discussions were conditioned upon 
131 and p . rJ3-lKMj. According!) , Delendanf s S t a t u n u n oi 1 act No. JO is 
nothing more than a bald assertion. 
1 
For the same reasons set forth above, this was nothing more than a mere 
discussion. Fiirther, Defendant Krogman did not testify that the Plaintiff 
would p ro \ i 
1 
The Defendant has raised no concei • • ^ -
Plaintiffs marshaling of the evidence 
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Mouille the $1000.00 per month payments. (Transcript, p. 156). 
The Defendant's Statement of Fact No. 19 is highly misleading. In 
fact, Mr. Rice testified that he had been approached by the Defendant Mouille 
to prepare two new agreements. (Transcript Supplement, p. 4). He prepared 
the documents and faxed them to Mr. Mouille. (Id. P. 7 and 9). He testified 
that the Plaintiff did not have any input into the drafting of the documents. 
(Id., p. 8). He then subsequently discussed only the assignment of the Lease 
Agreement with the Plaintiff by telephone in only a cursory manner: 
"A. I had prepared two documents, one of which I hadn't 
even discussed with Mr. Donohue yet. 
Q. You discussed this assignment of lease with him? 
A. Just by mention, yes, sir. 
Q. You told him the terms and conditions of it? 
A. No." (Id., p. 8). 
As to the Plaintiffs "willingness to enter into the agreement", as asserted by 
the Defendant, Mr. Rice testified that the Plaintiff only committed to 
reviewing the documents once they had been sent to him for review: 
Q. Would it be accurate to say, Mr. Donahue had never seen 
exhibit number 11 nor the lease agreement that you just 
described? 
A. That is accurate. 
Q. Ok. Is it accurate that Mr. Donahue merely indicated that he 
would review and consider it once you talked with him on the 
telephone? 
A. That's conect. (Id., p. 9). 
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1 net f . . : 
and committing to agree to a document. The Defendant's Statement of Fact 
that the Plaintiff told Mr Rice that he was willing to enter into the aller^ 
agreetiicn: 
Q jy0 Meeting of the Minds 
The Defendant agrees thai t.heie must be a meeting of (he minds in 
order for a contract or novation to be enforced. J>ML. 
Defctiilfiiil ill!1 i IJMI'I s llial llic piiHtl'nl .mi mal *^ u it & lenite must 
"must be clear, definite, mutually understood, and esiab1 . 
unequivocal and definite testimony, or other evidence of the same quality." 
Holmgi en Bi others, mi. \. jjaiunu " * - "d Brief 
of "Appellee, id. fhis is particular^ mnropriate where the Lease Agreement 
between the Plaintiff and Mouille. hxhibit P-?\ contains a paragraph, 
Paragrapti •
 Jt;Ji requires any assigi in lei its to be iii it • i itii ig I h s 
Defendant attempts to meet this ngorous standard by attempting to convert the 
meager discussions between the parties into a binding agreement and by 
ignoring the vM..er arguments raised In I lie lltiiiiili'lll iiii Ins Unci In (Ins I 'unit 
The Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that the parties engaged in 
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discussions over the 1986 Kenworth Tractor. However, these discussions 
were never consummated into any form of a verbal agreement, much less a 
written agreement. The Defendant has completely failed to address the points 
raised by the Plaintiff. 
First, the Defendant fails to explain or rebut the undisputed fact that the 
conversations at Mouille's Mother's house were considered by both Defendant 
Krogman and Mouille as "mere negotiations". (Testimony of Mouille, 
Transcript, p. 130). (Testimony of Krogman, Transcript, p. 193-194). 
Negotiations do not constitute a binding agreement. Discussions also do not 
constitute a binding agreement. Otherwise, no reasonable person would 
engage in any discussion concerning a transaction for fear that someone would 
assert an agreement existed by reason of the discussions alone. Clearly more 
is required. 
Second, the Defendant fails to explain or rebut the undisputed fact that 
Defendant Krogman and Mouille knew and understood during these 
discussions that any agreement was conditioned upon the signing of a 
subsequent written document, which never occurred. In fact, Mouille testified 
to this fact in response to a question from the District Court Judge himself! 
(Testimony of Mouille, Transcript, p. 131). Defendant Krogman also testified 
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that he understood that the talks were conditioned upon a written document. 
(Testimony of Krogman, Transcript, p. 193-194). Further, Defendant Mouille 
testified that the Plaintiff did not agree at Mouille's Mother's house that he 
would consent to the sale even when the written documents were prepared and 
presented to him. (Testimony of Mouille, Transcript, p. 130). Clearly, these 
discussions did not result in any meeting of the minds. 
Third, the Defendant fails to adequately explain or rebut the undisputed 
fact that the Lease Agreement between the Plaintiff and Mouille, Exhibit P-3 
or Addendum D to Brief of Appellant, was never canceled or modified. The 
Defendant admits this undisputed fact in his Brief, p. 26. And, both Mouille 
and Krogman testified at trial that it was never canceled or modified. 
(Testimony of Mouille, Transcript, p. 130 and Testimony of Krogman, 
Transcript, p. 192-193). The Defendant attempts to explain this conundrum 
by asserting, without any evidence, that a separate agreement was somehow 
created between the Plaintiff and Defendant Krogman. Brief of Appellee, p. 
26. Not only does the Defendant fail to cite any record testimony for this bald 
assertion, it makes absolutely no sense. Why would the Plaintiff enter into 
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two agreements for the same vehicle? 2 Why would Mouille want Plaintiff to 
enter into a separate sales agreement with Krogman if Mouille was still on the 
hook on the Lease Agreement? The Defendant's argument is nonsensical. If 
the Lease Agreement between the Plaintiff and Mouille was never canceled or 
modified, then the Plaintiff had eveiy right to declare a violation and repossess 
his vehicle. 
Fourth, the Defendant fails to adequately explain or rebut the testimony 
of John K. Rice. In order to avoid the damming testimony of Mr. Rice, the 
Defendant had to mischaracterize his testimony before this court. The 
Defendant asserts in his Brief at page 21-22 that Mr. Rice's testimony 
confirmed the alleged verbal agreement between the parties. The Defendant 
further asserts that Mr. Rice drafted a written agreement to "memorialize" the 
verbal agreement between the parties. Such is not true.3 Mr. Rice was 
2 
However, it does make sense to find that two agreements existed in this case. One 
between the Plaintiff and Mouille, which is the Lease Agreement, Exhibit P-3, and 
one between Mouille and Defendant Krogman which Mouille violated by again 
making promises to Krogman that he could deliver title when he couldn't. This 
scenario is consistent with the evidence in this case of other similar verbal agreements 
between Mouille and Krogman for the purchase and sale of tractors where Mouille 
took Krogman's money and couldn't deliver. 
3 
Both Defendant Krogman and Mouille failed to recall any meeting with Mr. Rice or 
asking him to prepare any documents. (Transcript, p. 132 and 193). 
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initially contacted by Mr. Mouille on March 24, 1992 (some 60-90 days after 
the alleged conversation at Mouille's Mother's house) and Mouille told Mr. 
Rice what Mouille wanted in the agreements. (Transcript Supplement, p. 4). 
Mr. Rice testified that he drafted two agreements without any discussion with 
the Plaintiff. (Id., p. 8). Mr. Rice drafted an "Assignment of Lease", Exhibit 
P-l 1, which contained a consent clause for the signature of the Plaintiff. He 
also drafted a new lease agreement between the Plaintiff and Haul Away 
Transport, Inc., which was Mouille's new corporation. (Id.) Mr. Rice then 
faxed the documents to Mouille on March 31, 1992 for Mouille's review and 
approval. (Id., p. 8 and 9). Mr. Rice testified that he never saw the documents 
again. (Id.). Mr. Rice testified that he had a telephone conversation with the 
Plaintiff a week or two after March 31, 1992. (Id., p. 7). Mr. Rice testified 
that he only discussed the assignment and did not discuss the other new lease 
agreement between the Plaintiff and Haul Away Transport, Inc. (Id., p.8). Mr. 
Rice testified that he did not discuss or inform the Plaintiff of the terms or 
conditions of the assignment. (Id.). In reply, the Plaintiff merely replied that 
he would review the document when it was ready for his signature and 
consider them. (Id., p. 8 and 9). Mr. Rice did not discuss any of the details of 
any alleged oral agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant Krogman. 
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Nor did Mr. Rice confirm that any agreement existed. Instead, Mr. Rice's 
testimony confirmed the fact that all of the parties believed that no agreement 
existed unless it was in writing and signed by the Plaintiff, which never 
occurred. 
No meeting of the minds occurred in this case. The Defendant's 
arguments to the contrary are undermined by clear, indisputable, and positive 
evidence which the Defendant has failed to rebut or explain away. 
D. Manifestations of Assent 
The Defendant asserts that this Court should ignore the fact that no 
written agreement or written consent was signed by the Plaintiff and should 
find the meager discussions between the parties sufficient because the Plaintiff 
"manifested" his assent to the Defendant's asserted verbal agreement in 
several alleged ways. The Defendant's arguments are without evidentiaiy 
support and are wholly devoid of merit. 
The Defendant claims the Plaintiffs assent was manifested by 
"allowing Defendant Krogman to drive the Kenworth truck for 16 months." 
Brief of Appellee, p. 25. Again the Defendant is misleading the court. 
Following the discussion at Mouille's Mother's house in January, 1992, the 
Defendant Krogman had no further contact with the Plaintiff at all until 
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September 21 or 23, 1993. (Testimony of Krogman, Transcript, p. 196). All 
of Krogman's contacts were with Mouille during this period of time. The 
undisputed evidence was that the Plaintiff did not know that Krogman had the 
vehicle. (Testimony of Plaintiff, Transcript, p. 63). In fact, the Plaintiff 
thought that Mouille was continuing to use the Kenworth at Haul Away 
Transport, Inc.4 (Id., p. 35). Therefore, the Plaintiff did not "allow" the 
Defendant to use the vehicle. 
The Defendant claims the Plaintiffs assent was manifested by 
Mouille's telephone call to the Plaintiff requesting a payoff figure on the note 
to Associates. Not true. Mouille did not testify that he was calling for anyone 
other than himself. 
The Defendant claims the Plaintiffs assent was manifested by the fact 
that the Plaintiff did not make any payments to Associates on the vehicle and 
that the Plaintiff did not pay any tractor insurance, taxes, licenses, etc., during 
the period the alleged agreement was in place. Again the Defendant is 
misleading the Court. Under the Lease Agreement between the Plaintiff and 
4 
Indeed, there would be no way for the Plaintiff to know that Defendant Krogman was 
exercising any individual control over the vehicle. Defendant Krogman drove the 
vehicle for Mouille for almost a year prior to the alleged oral agreement. (Testimony 
of Mouille, Transcript, p. 89-90). By all appearances nothing had changed. 
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Mouille, Exhibit P-3, which was admittedly never canceled or modified, the 
Plaintiff was not obligated to pay any of these items. This was Mouille's 
responsibility. 
Finally, the Defendant claims that the Plaintiffs assent was manifested 
by his failure to demand either the $500.00 payments or the return of the 
vehicle from Mouille. The Plaintiff testified he didn't do so because he and 
Mouille had been long term friends, because he knew Mouille was in financial 
trouble and needed to support a large family, and because he believed Mouille 
would ultimately pay the amounts. (Testimony of Plaintiff, Transcript, p. 35). 
Indeed Mouille testified to the same effect, "He knew I would honor it." 
(Testimony of Mouille, Transcript, p. 108). 
The Defendant fails to explain away or rebut the undisputed conduct of 
the parties after the alleged oral agreement was formed which demonstiates no 
assent. The Defendant failed to explain why all of his contacts after the 
alleged oral agreement were with Mouille and not the Plaintiff, why the 
Defendant contacted Mouille for the payoff and not the Plaintiff, why the 
Defendant initially demanded title from Mouille and not the Plaintiff or why 
Mouille sent $505.00 to Defendant Mouille on August 30, 1993 so that the 
Defendant could return the Kenworth to the Plaintiff, as demanded by the 
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Plaintiff. The Defendant also failed to explain away or rebut the fact that the 
Defendant claimed his agreement was with Mouille, and not the Plaintiff, in 
the Defendant's adversary complaint in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
against Mouille. This subsequent conduct clearly manifests no assent to any 
discussions which may or may not have occurred at Mouille's Mother's house. 
Point Two 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
THE ALLEGED ORAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT BARRED 
BY UTAH'S STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
The Defendant asserts that Utah's Statute of Frauds doesn't apply due 
to part performance by Defendant Krogman. While the Plaintiff agrees with 
this legal principle, the facts do not support the concept. Here, the undisputed 
evidence was that Mouille and Krogman engaged in a work-credit system and 
Mouille continued to pay Associates as he had in the past. There was no 
evidence that the Plaintiff was aware that Mouille was paying Associates 
pursuant to any work-credit system between Mouille and Krogman. As the 
Supreme Court has noted, in order for part performance to remove a contract 
from the Statute of Frauds, the performance must be "clear and definite." 
Martin v. Scholl 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983). 
In order to avoid this requirement, the Defendant asserts that Mouille 
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was the Plaintiffs agent. (Brief of Appellee, p. 30). However, there was no 
evidence, nor any argument made, in the District Court to support this 
position. The District Court did not make any finding to this effect either. 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that Mouille was acting in his own self interest. 
Whose interests was he serving when he pocketed Krogman's $5,763.29 
which was sent by Krogman in good faith to pay off the balance to 
Associates? 
Point Three 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
The Defendant does not dispute the Plaintiffs argument that this Court 
may remand this case to the District Court with instructions to enter a 
judgment for the Plaintiff in the amount of $17,390.86 if this Court mles that 
no enforceable verbal agreement existed between the Plaintiff and Defendant. 
The only defense the Defendant has to the Plaintiffs claims is that of the 
alleged verbal agreement and, if that fails, the Plaintiff is entitled to a 
judgment without any further hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in finding that an oral agreement existed and it 
erred in dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint. The Plaintiff respectfully 
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requests this Court to reverse the District Court and to remand with 
instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant Krogman for $17,390.86, interests, and costs. The Plaintiff 
respectfully requests his costs on appeal. 
DATED this [ (p day of October, 1995. 
JR. db OA 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Attorney for Appellant 
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